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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWER TO LICENSE OR PROHIBIT
POOL RooMs.--Recent unsuccessful attempts of municipal
corporations to regulate and prohibit the operation of pool
rooms within their limits have raised the question of just
what powers of that sort are conferred upon municipalities
by general statutes, without regard to special charter pro-
visions.
To operate a pool room within the state, it is necessary
to obtain a license from the state.' This license is granted
by the county courts,2 and they are empowered to refuse a
license to such an establishment in premises where the laws
peculiar to pool rooms have been violated within the year
next preceding the application." Prior to the year 1919, there
were two ways in which a municipal corporation could
affect this grant of license for a pool room within its limits.
First, it could require the payment of a license tax not
greater than that exacted by the state.4 Second, in certain
instances it had concurrent powers with the county court
to supervise the issuance of state licenses. By Acts of
1919, c. 102, § 130, the latter provisions were repealed,
leaving to the municipal corporations only the power to tax.
In this state of the law it was held that a municipal council
had no power to regulate the hours of opening and closing
pool rooms; 6 and that it could not refuse a municipal license
to one who tendered the proper fee.
7
Within less than a year after these defects in municipal
powers were exposed, the legislature enacted the following
clause, amendatory of c. 47, § 28, Barnes' W. Va. Code:
"The council of such city, town or village shall have
plenary power and authority therein * * * * to license, or
prohibit, the operation of pool and billiard rooms, and
maintaining for hire of pool and billiard tables, and in
event any such business is licensed in such town, to make
and enforce reasonable ordinances regulating the same." 8
On its face, this 'legislation would seem to grant munici-
pal corporations at least a very broad discretion in the mat-
SBARNES' W. VA. CODE, e. 82, §1.
2 BARNES' W. VA. CODE, c. 32, §11.
. BARNES' W. VA. CODE, e. 82, §35a.
4 BARNES' W. VA. CODE, 1918, c. 47, §33.
BARNES' W. VA. CODE, 1918, c. 32, §15.
6 Bissett v. Town of Littleton, 87 W. Va. 127, 104 S. E. 289 (1920).
7 State ex rel Kelley v. City of Grafton, 81 W. Va. 191, 104 S. E. 487 (1020).
8 AcTS 1921, e. 143.
1
W.: Municipal Corporations--Power to License or Prohibit Pool Rooms
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1926
STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
ter of licensing pool rooms. Shortly after its passage, how-
ever, the court held that the council of such a municipality
had no discretion to refuse a license to one who could not be
charged with a violation of law in his establishment.9 In
the same volume of reports there is a case arising on a
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a county court
and a town council to issue licenses to operate a pool room
therein. The respondents were able to establish the fact that
the applicant had violated the law in the conduct of his busi-
ness within the past year, and the writ was denied.10 This
result was reached in reliance on § 35a of c. 32, which
empowers the county court to refuse a license to such an ap-
licant. It is difficult to see how that section justified the
town council which was not within its provisions. In neither
of the cases last referred to did the court discuss the amend-
ment of 1921 above quoted. The most recent case on the
point is one where a city council refused a license to operate
a pool room near a state school. The council was ordered
to issue the license because it could not establish anything
beyond the fact that a pool room in that particular place
was undesirable.11 In the consideration of that case, the
court did discuss the amendment of 1921, but reached the
same result obtaining before its enactment.
What could the legislature have meant in thus amend-
ing the statute conferring specific powers on municipal
councils? It seems quite unreasonable to consider it as a
fiscal measure, because ample powers of that sort had al-
ready been conferred on municipalities by another statute.?
Indeed, the language of the amendment probably would not
warrant a tax for revenue.13 The only alternative, if the
amendment means anything at all, is that it means what it
says; and confers absolute and unqualified14 powers to regu-
late the maintenance of such establishments upon the towns
where they are located.
One point made by the court in holding it an abuse of
discretion to refuse such a license for any cause but viola-
tion of law, is that in every instance the applicant will be
' State cz rel Hoffman v. Town of Clendennin, 92 W. Va. 618, 115 S. E. 583, 29
A. L. R. 37 (1922).
11 State ex rel Hamrick v. County Court, et u2., 92 W. Va. 222, 114 S. E. 519 (1922).
U State ex el Hardman v. Town of Glenville, 134 S. E. 467 (W. Va. 1926).
12 BARNES' W. VA. CODE, c. 47, §33.
DILLON, MUN. CORPS., §1408.
14 WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICT., "Plenary: full, entire, complete, absolute, unqualified."
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licensed by the state and will have paid money into its cof-
fers for the privilege of operating the pool room. It is
proper for the state to delegate powers of regulation over
a matter already subject to state regulation.' 6 And when
such a statutory delegation is made, it is not necessarily in-
consistent with the former statutes imposing state regula-
tion. The two may therefore go concurrently.10 A state li-
cense ordinarily confers no contractual or property rights,
so that its subsequent abrogation by state law is consti-
tutional. 1'7 It would seem that an abrogation by an "arm of
the state." would stand on the same footing. And even if
the grant of complete municipal power were wholly incon-
sistent with the earlier state license laws, would not the
latter prevail over the former?' 8
In practically all our decisions on the question under
consideration, the court has stressed the fact that a pool
room is not a nuisance per se, and has compared it with a
Y.M.C.A. because pool is played in both places.'9 The fact
that such an institution is not a nuisance per se would be
of importance if the municipal control were sought to be
exercised under a grant of power to abate nuisances; but
the powers conferred by the amendment of 1921 were not
made contingent upon the existence of a common law
nuisance.
It is a matter of common knowledge that in many in-
stances pool rooms are positive agencies of harm in their
communities. 20 They are generally considered sufficiently ob-
noxious to justify their prohibition under the police power.
21
One court has even gone so far as to brand them the suc-
cessor to the saloon as a breeder of vice. 22 If it is true that
4 Fellows v. Charleston, 62 W. Va. 665, 69 S. E. 623 (1907); BAnNES' W. VA.
CoD:,, e. 32, §§18 and 20; Idem, c. 47 §33.
'a Moore v. Minneapolis, 43 Minn. 418, 45 N. W. 719 (1890).
27 St. Anthony v. Water Com'rs., 168 U. S. 3499 18 Sup. Ct. 167 (1897).
"825 R. C. L. §170, and cases cited.
" "'In Bissett v. Littleton, supra, we alluded to the uses made of pool and billiard
tables in clubs, Y. M. C. A. buildings, churches, and in private homes, engaged In the
moral uplift of the people, young and old, of their communities." State ez rcl Hardman
v. Town of Glenville, supra.
2' Burlingame v. Thompson, 74 Kan. 393, 86 Pac. 449, 11 Ann. Cas. 604 (1900);
Morgan v. State, 64 Neb. 369, 90 N. W. 108 (1902) ; Thomas v. Foster, 108 S., C. 08, 93
S. E. 397 (1917) ; State ex Tel Hawkins v. Harris, 289 S. W. 664 (Mo. 1922).
21 Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623, 66 L. ed. 1229, 82 Sup. Ct. 697, 41 L. I. A.
(N. S.) 163 (1912) ; State ex rel Hamrick v. County Court, 92 W. Va. 222, 114 S. E. 619
(19,22) ; Purvis v. Osailla, 149 Ga. 771, 102 S. E. 241 (1920) ; Burlingame v. Thompson,
supra; Cole v. Culbertson, 86 Neb. 160, 125 N. W. 287 (1910) ; DILLON,. MUN.
Comps., §731; 6 R. C. L. 207.
2 "Since the abolition of the saloon, the billiard halls * are the natural gather-
ing places for the elements of society which prey off their fellow men." State cz rel
Sayles v. Superior Court, 120 Wash. 183, 208 Pac. 966 (1922).
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there are good pool rooms and bad ones, it seems that the
power to determine which is which can best be exercised by
the local authorities. Our statute in words confers such a
power, with plenary authority to prohibit the bad ones.
Great civic good could be done by giving effect to that
statute.
-J. E. F. W.
4
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